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ABSTRACT 
As a division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Security Branch, the 
Terrorist Screening Center maintains the Terrorist Watchlist, a central database for 
identifying individuals known or suspected to engage in terrorism or terrorist 
activities. Subsumed under the Terrorist Watchlist is the No Fly List, which prohibits 
individuals from boarding commercial aircrafts in and out of the United States. 
Placement on either list presumes named individuals as a potential threat to U.S. 
national security, yet there is no restriction preventing them from legally purchasing 
firearms. Following a mass shooting at an Orlando nightclub in June of 2016, which 
was perpetrated by an individual recently removed from the Terrorist Watchlist, the 
Senate proposed two gun control measures specifically aimed at preventing 
individuals on the Terrorist Watchlist from purchasing firearms. Both proposals were 
rejected. This article explores the constitutional and procedural concerns that led the 
Senate’s rejection of both proposals, and concludes by introducing gun control 
regulation tailored to address those concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
HILLARY CLINTON: We need comprehensive 
background checks, and we need to keep guns out of the 
hands of those who will do harm. And we finally need to 
pass a prohibition on anyone who’s on the terrorist 
watch list from being able to buy a gun in our country. 
If you’re too dangerous to fly, you are too dangerous to 
buy a gun. So there are things we can do, and we ought 
to do it in a bipartisan way. 
*  *  *  * 
DONALD TRUMP: First of all, I agree . . . [w]hen a 
person is on a watch list or a no-fly list, and I have the 
endorsement of the NRA, which I’m very proud of. 
These are very, very good people, and they’re 
protecting the Second Amendment. But I think we have 
to look very strongly at no-fly lists and watch lists.
1
 
n February of 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) 
began conducting background checks against Terrorist Watchlist 
records.
2
 Since then, the data shows that individuals on the Terrorist 
Watchlist were involved in 2,477 background checks involving the 
sale of firearms or explosives.
3
 Of that number, 91 percent of the 
transactions were allowed to proceed.
4
 In 2015 alone, 223 out of 244 
transactions were completed.
 5
 
                                                 
1
 Transcript of the First Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/us/ politics/transcript-debate.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/NR94-6QNL]. 
2
 Letter from Diana C. Maurer, Dir., Homeland Sec. and Justice Issues, to Dianne 
Feinstein, Sen., U.S. Senate (Mar. 7, 2016) (on file with author), available at 
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ 
files/serve?File_id=F53C4195-430D-4D8D-
ACDE1EC53E97D0FA&SK=EF4E6FF4158FFA49E570234A3D E8E438 
[https://perma.cc/S4EF-GUGU]. 
3
 Id. at 2. 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. (21 individuals were prohibited from completing the transaction due to 
reasons unrelated to the Terrorist Watchlist, e.g., prior felony convictions, 
adjudicated mental health, under indictment, etc.). 
I 
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As a division of the FBI’s National Security Branch, the Terrorist 
Screening Center (“TSC”) maintains the Terrorist Watchlist (“TWL”), 
a database containing information on individuals who are known or 
reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist activity.
6
 Being on 
the No Fly List, which is a subset of the TWL, prohibits individuals 
from boarding commercial aircrafts in and out of the United States.
7
 
As it stands, these individuals have been deemed too great a threat to 
fly and yet there is no restriction preventing them from legally 
purchasing firearms. In June 2016, Congress proposed two gun control 
measures to prevent known or suspected terrorists from purchasing 
firearms.
8
 The proposals were introduced following a mass shooting in 
an Orlando nightclub—perpetrated by an individual recently removed 
from the TWL—that left 49 patrons dead.9 Both proposals were 
rejected.
10
 Such a result is unacceptable. 
Congress needs to pass gun regulations which disallow known or 
suspected terrorists on, or recently removed from, the FBI’s Terrorist 
Watchlist, and its subsets, from legally purchasing firearms in the 
United States. If the government has deemed certain individuals to be 
such a threat to our national security, so much as to prevent them from 
flying on commercial aircrafts, common sense dictates these 
individuals be prevented from being able to legally purchase firearms, 
as well. 
Part I of this Article will lay the groundwork for which gun 
regulation proposals can firmly stand on. This platform requires an 
understanding of the current interpretation of the Second Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution and the operation of the FBI’s TSC. With 
respect to both, an exploration into their reach and limitations is 
                                                 
6
 About the Terrorist Screening Center, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about/lea dership-and-structure/national-security-branch/tsc 
(last visited Oct. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Y3R6-6JBB]. 
7
 U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, The No Fly List and Selectee Lists, 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/ about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-
11/just-the-facts-1/terrorist-screening-center-1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/9T93-XFVG]. 
8
 Donovan Slack, Senate Blocks Gun Measures Offered in Wake of Orlando 
Shooting, USA TODAY (June 20, 2016, 9:27 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/20/senate-gun-vote-after-
orlando-shooting/86143418/ [https://perma.cc/D8DP-AGBQ]. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
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necessary. Additionally, a look into the FBI’s NICS and how it relates 
to individuals on the TWL is warranted. Lastly, this foundation will 
highlight a correlation between known or suspected terrorists on the 
TWL and mass shootings in the United States. 
Part II of this Article will begin to build on the footing set by 
reviewing two out of four gun control measures proposed by Congress 
in June of 2016.
11
 The proposals are competing measures introduced 
for the purpose of providing a uniform procedure on how to handle the 
transfer of a firearm when the transferee is an individual on, or 
recently removed from, the TWL. Each regulation, and its reason for 
rejection, will be analyzed. Part III of this Article introduces a gun 
control measure designed to regulate the purchase and sale of firearms 
for individuals on the TWL, while also addressing the constitutional 
and procedural concerns which led to the rejection of the two June 
proposals. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Second Amendment 
The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads: “A well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”12 
In 2008, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court, for the first time, 
enforced the Second Amendment as an individual right.
13
 Prior to the 
Court’s decision, the meaning of the Second Amendment was highly 
debated; did it protect an individual right to possess a firearm, or was 
the right to possess a firearm connected with service in the militia?
14
 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the respondent brought forth an 
action to enjoin the District of Columbia from enforcing a bar on 
registering handguns.
15
 The District Court dismissed the complaint and 
respondent appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
                                                 
11
 Id. The two gun control measures not being discussed are beyond the scope of 
this Article, as they do not specifically address controlling the purchase of 
firearms by individuals on the TWL. 
12
 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
13
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
14
 Id. at 577. 
15
 Id. at 575-76. 
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the District of Columbia.
16
 The Court of Appeals held that the Second 
Amendment provided an individual right to possess firearms and that 
the District of Columbia’s total ban on handguns violated that right.17 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this matter.
18
 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority and 
pointed to the history and text of the Second Amendment to ascertain 
its meaning.
19
 In analyzing the text he stated that there are two parts to 
the Second Amendment: its prefatory clause, which states “a well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,” and 
its operative clause, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms, 
shall not be infringed.”20 Following his analysis of the text, Scalia 
concluded that the operative clause “guarantee[s] [an] individual the 
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,”21 which 
is not limited by the prefatory clause, but rather announces a 
purpose.
22
 
Scalia made it blatantly clear that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual right to possess firearms, but that that right is not 
unlimited: 
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text 
and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an 
individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the 
right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s 
right of free speech was not. Thus, we do not read the 
Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to 
carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do 
not read the First Amendment to protect the right of 
citizens to speak for any purpose.
23
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. at 577-80. 
21
 Id. at 592. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. at 595. 
382 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 376 
Later in his opinion, Scalia expanded on his statement regarding 
limitations: 
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited. Although we do not 
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the 
full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long standing 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
24
 
This passage is significant as it paves a path for Congress to lay 
down legislation and restrictions on the purchase and sale of firearms. 
Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court, in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,
25
 rendered the Second Amendment applicable to state 
governments via the Fourteenth Amendment.
26
 As Heller was decided 
in the District of Columbia, the majority did not address the issue of 
state applicability in its opinion. 
In McDonald, residents sued the city of Chicago for its handgun 
ban as a violation of their Second Amendment right to possess 
firearms.
27
 Chicago argued that its laws were constitutional because 
the Second Amendment did not apply to the States.
28
 The Supreme 
Court heard the case to decide whether the Second Amendment is 
applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
29
 
Deciding this issue in the affirmative, Justice Samuel Alito, who 
wrote for the majority, supported his reasoning by looking to Heller.
30
 
As stated in Heller, “[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by 
many legal systems from ancient times to the present day . . . [and that 
                                                 
24
 Id. at 626-27. 
25
 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
26
 Id. at 750. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
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basic right] is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment 
right.”31 Alito states: 
Heller makes it clear that this right is deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition. Heller explored the right’s origins, noting that 
the 1689 English Bill of Rights explicitly protected a right to keep 
arms for self-defense, and that by 1765, Blackstone was able to assert 
that the right to keep and bear arms was one of the fundamental rights 
of Englishmen.
32
 
Reflecting on the history highlighted in Heller, Alito pronounces, 
“It is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental 
rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”33 Accordingly, the 
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment right to possess firearms.
34
 
Thus, the current understanding of the Second Amendment is that 
it protects an individual right to possess firearms, and that that right is 
applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. However, this protected right is not 
unlimited. 
B. The FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center 
The FBI’s TSC was established in 2003 in the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.
35
 The TSC maintains the TWL, a consolidated 
database of information identifying individuals known or suspected to 
be engaged in terrorism or terrorist activities.
36
 The TWL serves as a 
bridge between multiple government agencies, i.e., Homeland 
Security, Law Enforcement, the Intelligence Community, and 
international partners.
37
 
Before adding a name to the TWL, there is a vetting process by 
numerous U.S. governmental agencies.
38
 Once vetting is complete, the 
                                                 
31
 Id. at 767. 
32
 Id. at 768. 
33
 Id. at 778. 
34
 Id. 
35
 About the Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 6. 
36
 Terrorist Screening Center – FAQs, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/terrorist-screening-center-frequently-asked-
questions.pdf/view (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) [https://perma.cc/WH2Q-LAH3]. 
37
 About the Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 6. 
38
 Id. 
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agencies will submit recommendations to the National 
Counterterrorism Center (“NCTC”), 39 who then reviews the 
information provided to determine whether there is a factual basis to 
suspect the person is a known or suspected terrorist.
40
 If the 
information is sufficient, the person is entered into the Terrorist 
Identities Datamart Environment (“TIDE”).41 That information is then 
circulated to the FBI to include the individual on the TWL.
42
 Upon 
receiving this information, the FBI will conduct another review to 
verify the person meets the standard set for inclusion on the TWL.
43
 
The standard set for including an individual on the TWL is 
reasonable suspicion that the person in question is a known or 
suspected terrorist.
44
 To meet this standard, agencies submitting 
recommendations must rely upon: 
articulable intelligence or information which, taken 
together with rational inference from those facts, 
reasonably warrants a determination that an individual 
is known or suspected to be or have been knowingly 
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in 
aid of, or related to terrorism or terrorist activities. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, a 
nominating agency must provide an objective factual 
                                                 
39
 Terrorist Screening Center – FAQs, supra note 36 (recommendations based 
solely on race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, or First 
Amendment-protected activities are not accepted). 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. As of June 2016, TIDE contained roughly 1.5 million people, including 
approximately 15,000 U.S. persons. 
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. (The FBI defines a “known terrorist” as “an individual whom the U.S. 
Government knows is engaged, has been engaged, or who intends to engage in 
terrorism and/or terrorist activity, including an individual (a) who has been 
charged, arrested, indicted, or convicted for a crime related to terrorism by U.S. 
Government or foreign government authorities; or (b) identified as a terrorist or 
member of a designated foreign terrorist organization pursuant to statute, 
Executive Order or international legal obligation pursuant to a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution.” The FBI defines a “suspected terrorist” as “an 
individual who is reasonably suspected to be, or has been, engaged in conduct 
constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism and/or terrorist 
activities based on an articulable and reasonable suspicion.”). 
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basis to believe an individual is a known or suspected 
terrorist.
45
 
After reviewing the information to ensure the recommended 
individual meets the standard set forth, the individual will be added to 
the TWL.
46
 
The FBI also monitors the No Fly List, a subset of the TWL.
47
 The 
No Fly List prohibits individuals who may present a threat to “civil 
aviation” or “national security” from boarding commercial aircrafts 
flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this includes 
international flights operated by U.S. carriers.
48
 For an individual to be 
included on the No Fly List, there must be credible information 
demonstrating that such person poses a threat of “committing a violent 
act of terrorism with respect to civil aviation, the homeland, United 
States interests located abroad, or is operationally capable of doing 
so.”49 
The FBI monitors both the TWL and the No Fly List to ensure 
their accuracy.
50
 However, in a 2005 audit of the TSC by the U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”), it was 
reported that the TSC was riddled with inaccurate and inconsistent 
information.
51
 Concerned with its findings, the OIG made 
recommendations for mitigating the faults of the system and a new 
audit was scheduled for 2007.
52
 During its follow-up audit, the OIG 
reported progress by the FBI in its effort to ensure the quality of the 
data on the TWL, but found lingering errors.
53
 Such errors included 
inappropriately watchlisting individuals, failing to adequately identify 
known or suspected terrorists, failing to undertake watchlist redress, 
failing to discard duplicate records, and inconsistencies in the FBI’s 
                                                 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT DIV., Follow-Up 
Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center, 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0741/final.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/QU3Y-RKQZ]. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
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procedure for processing watchlist data.
54
 At the end of its report, the 
OIG provided another set of recommendations for closing the gaps 
found in the TSC.
55
 
The FBI is aware of the faults present within the TSC and TWL, 
and has undertaken a range of measures to ensure the information 
provided is accurate and timely.
56
 Such measures include: regular 
reviews, periodic audits, and post-encounter reviews.
 57
 The FBI and 
nominating agencies perform these tasks to ensure the information 
continues to satisfy the standards set for inclusion.
58
 It goes without 
saying that it is imperative that this information be as accurate and 
consistent as humanly possible. As the OIG stated in its audit report, 
“a single omission of a terrorist identity or an inaccuracy in the 
identifying information contained in a watchlist record can have 
enormous consequences.”59 
C. The FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System 
In 1993, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady 
Act”) 60 was enacted to provide for a waiting period before firearms 
were purchased, and for establishing a national criminal background 
check system.
61
 Authorized by the Brady Act, the FBI’s NICS was 
established for Federal Firearms Licensees (“FFLs”) to contact the FBI 
for the purpose of acquiring information on intended transferees in 
order to determine whether a transfer would violate 18 U.S.C., § 922 
(g) or (n).
62
 
                                                 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Terrorist Screening Center – FAQs, supra note 36. 
57
 Id. An encounter is where an individual is identified during a screening process 
as a potential match for someone identified on the TWL. This can occur during 
an individual’s attempt to board an aircraft, apply for a passport or visa, or has 
an interaction with law enforcement. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Follow-up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 51. 
60
 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(1993). 
61
 About NICS, U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics/about-nics (last visited Oct. 18, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/NT8P-9GLP]. 
62
 Id. 
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The NICS is a national system which searches available records on 
potential transferees in order to determine whether an individual is 
disqualified from procuring a firearm.
63
 The prohibitive criteria for 
disqualifying individuals is outlined in 18 U.S.C., § 922 (g) & (n).
64
 If 
an intended transferee matches one of the categories delineated, the 
transaction is prohibited from completing. Under 18 U.S.C., § 922 (g) 
& (n), it is unlawful for persons who: are fugitives; have been 
adjudicated as a mental defective; are aliens and illegally or unlawfully 
in the United States; or have been convicted for using or possessing a 
controlled substance within a certain time period to possess or receive 
any firearm.
65
 The preceding list is not exhaustive; rather it is a mere 
glimpse into the prohibitive measures taken to prevent persons from 
possessing or receiving a firearm.
66
 If an intended transferee is denied 
the transfer of a firearm, (s)he can seek remedial action under section 
103(g) of the Brady Act and pursue a remedy for erroneous 
deprivation under 18 U.S.C. § 925A.
67
 
In order to qualify or disqualify individuals from purchasing 
firearms, the NICS cross-checks available records with descriptive 
information provided to them by FFLs.
68
 This procedure, and the 
NICS system, was developed by the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), and local and state 
enforcement agencies.
69
 The system itself is computerized and is 
designed to provide results instantaneously on background check 
inquiries. 
In Calendar Year 2015, the NICS Contacted Call Centers handled 
calls an average of 141 seconds. After transferring the calls to the 
NICS Section,
70
 the wait and processing time averaged 446.3 seconds. 
                                                 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. 
65
 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (n). 
66
 Id. (see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (n) for full list of prohibitive criteria.). 
67
 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act § 103(g); 18 U.S.C. § 925A. 
68
 About NICS, supra note 61 (FFLs gather this information from intended 
transferees during the purchase process as required by the ATF). 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. (NICS Section processes background checks for FFLs when a state declines 
to serve as the point of contact for the NICS). 
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When firearm background checks were conducted via the NICS E-
check,
71
 the wait and processing time averaged 107.5 seconds.
72
 
Once results are received, and so long as there are no matching 
records returned by any of the databases warranting delay, FFLs may 
proceed with the transfer.
73
 
When the NICS returns a match between an intended transferee’s 
descriptive information with available records located in the databases, 
the transaction will be briefly delayed.
74
 When this occurs, FFLs will 
be transferred to NICS Section, where the information will be 
reviewed and evaluated by a NICS Legal Instruments Examiner.
75
 A 
NICS Legal Examiner has access to protected information and will 
review the information provided on the intended transferee to 
determine if prohibitive criteria exists to deny the purchase.
76
 If a 
NICS Legal Examiner does not find the existence of prohibitive 
criteria, FFLs may proceed with the transfer.
77
 
If a NICS Legal Examiner does find prohibitive criteria, there 
exists two possible outcomes: denial, or delay.
78
 When a NICS Legal 
Examiner finds the existence of criteria for prohibiting the transfer of a 
firearm, FFLs will be instructed to deny the transfer. However, if 
“potentially”79 prohibitive criteria exists, and more information is 
required to make a determination, FFLs will be advised that the 
firearm transaction will be delayed.
80
 A delay only lasts for three 
business days, and after that, if a final determination has not been 
                                                 
71
 Id. (NICS E-check allows FFLs to initiate an unassisted NICS background check 
via the internet). 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. While it is impressive that a computerized system checks for available 
records within two minutes so that a transfer can be made, it is equally alarming 
that within two minutes time a computerized system is relied on to decide 
whether a firearm transfer should proceed. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 About NICS, supra note 61 (potentially prohibitive information exists when the 
NICS indicates the subject of the background check has matched similar 
descriptive features in the system, i.e., name, sex, race, etc.). 
80
 Id. 
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rendered by the NICS, it is within a FFLs discretion whether to 
proceed with the firearm transfer, subject to state law.
81
 
D. NICS and the Terrorist Watchlist 
 In November 2003, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) directed 
the FBI to reform the NICS’ procedures to include measures to screen 
prospective firearm transferees against the TWL.
82
 Less than four 
months later, the FBI began cross-checking background checks for 
firearms against the TWL.
83
 When a TWL match occurs, the NICS 
delays the transfer for the requisite three business days.
84
 During the 
interim, NICS contacts the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division to 
research for any unknown prohibiting factors.
85
 If the FBI fails to 
uncover any prohibiting factors after the allotted time, FFLs may 
proceed with the transfer at their discretion.
86
 Following the 
conclusion of the requisite delay period, the FBI continues working on 
the case for up to 90 days in case information arises which authorizes a 
final determination.
87
 
So, while there is a system in place to prevent known or suspected 
terrorists from purchasing firearms, it appears weak. Individuals are 
placed on the TWL because the FBI has been provided with specific 
and articulable intelligence warranting their inclusion.
88
 Yet, the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division is only given three business days to prohibit 
the transfer of a firearm to an individual on the TWL.
89
 It seems 
illogical that the procedures set forth for individuals believed likely to 
engage in terrorist activities be held to the same nominal standard for 
intended transferees under no investigation.
90
 Furthermore, there does 
                                                 
81
 Id. 
82
 William J. Krouse, Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for 
Firearms, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (May 1, 2013), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/209937.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WC72-3GAF]. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. 
88
 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
89
 Krouse, supra note 82, at 13. 
90
 See supra notes 61 & 82 and accompanying text. 
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not seem to be any procedures in place for prohibiting the transfer of a 
firearm to persons recently removed from the TWL or its subset, the 
No Fly List. Congress should enact legislation which heightens the 
standard for transferring firearms to known or suspected terrorists on, 
or recently removed from, the TWL. 
E. Current Events 
The United States is no stranger to mass shootings; in 2016 alone, 
there were 384.
91
 Mass shootings, and the events proceeding them, 
have become almost routine: shooting occurs, people die, families 
mourn, debate commences on gun regulation, Congress fails to act, 
and repeat. Recent mass shootings have generated discussion on 
enacting gun regulation to prevent individuals on the TWL and its 
subset, the No Fly List, from purchasing firearms. 
The first of two events to spark this conversation was a mass 
shooting which occurred in San Bernardino, California. On December 
2, 2015, a married couple, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, 
opened fire on a holiday work party resulting in the death of fourteen 
people.
92
 The attack was carried out with assault rifles and semi-
automatic handguns.
93
 During a subsequent investigation, the FBI 
revealed that all of the couple’s guns were bought legally. Farook had 
purchased two 9-millimeter handguns used in the attack, but it was 
unclear how Farook and Malik obtained the assault rifles as a non-
participator in the attack originally purchased them.
94
 While these 
individuals were not on any watchlist, the investigation uncovered that 
the perpetrators declared allegiance to the Islamic State prior to the 
attack.
95
 
Following the investigation, Senate proposed and rejected two gun 
control measures focused on preventing individuals on the TWL from 
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purchasing firearms.
96
 Democratic Senator, Dianne Feinstein proposed 
one measure which was rejected on a 54-45 vote, while Republican 
Senator, John Cornyn’s competing measure was rejected on a 55-45 
vote.
97
 As this issue was left unresolved, the doors remained open for 
another attack to take place. 
Not even seven months removed from San Bernardino, forty-nine 
people were killed in the largest modern day mass shooting when 
Omar Mateen opened fire at the Pulse Nightclub (“Pulse”) in Orlando, 
Florida.
98
 The attack occurred in the earlier hours of June 12, 2016, 
when Mateen entered Pulse with two weapons he had legally 
purchased just one-week prior.
 99
 Records reveal that Mateen 
possessed a valid firearm license and had done so since September 
2011.
100
 
During the course of the shooting, Mateen phoned 911 to identify 
himself and pledge allegiance to the Islamic State, prompting an 
investigation by the FBI.
101
 As a result of the investigation, FBI 
Director, James B. Comey, released information regarding Mateen’s 
placement on the TWL in 2013 and 2014.
102
 In 2013, the FBI 
investigated Mateen after he claimed to have ties to two terrorist 
groups, al-Qaida and Hezbollah.
103
 Mateen was on the TWL for ten 
months before being removed.
104
 Approximately one-year later, the 
FBI placed Mateen back on the TWL while investigating persons with 
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possible ties to a U.S. citizen who blew himself up in a suicide attack 
in Syria.
105
 Finding no connection, the FBI once again removed 
Mateen from the TWL.
106
 
The announcement of Mateen’s placement and subsequent removal 
from the TWL, coupled with his ability to legally purchase firearms 
sparked outrage. It had been just seven months since the San 
Bernardino shooting, and the nation found itself in the midst of another 
mass shooting revolution. Would this be the event that broke the 
cycle? Congress answers that question in the negative. 
II. FAILED GUN REGULATIONS AND THE TERRORIST WATCHLIST 
A. Analysis 
On June 13, 2016, the morning after the Orlando mass shooting, 
newspaper headlines across the country were of no surprise: “An Act 
of Terror and Act of Hate”; “A Night of Terror in Orlando”; 
“Deadliest Day”; “Massacre in the Night.”107 Sadly, neither were the 
headlines on June 20, 2016: “Senate Votes Down Gun Control 
Proposals in Wake of Orlando Shootings”; “Senate Rejects Series of 
Gun Measures”; “Senate Rejects 4 Gun Proposals Inspired by Orlando 
Attack”; “Senate Rejects 4 Measures to Control Gun Sales.”108 Why is 
this of no surprise? Because Congress repeatedly fails to pass 
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legislation aimed to regulate the purchase and sales of firearms. “Over 
just the past five years, lawmakers have introduced more than 100 gun 
control proposals in Congress, since Gabrielle Gifford and 18 other 
people were shot in Tucson, Arizona in January 2011.”109 “Not one of 
them has been passed into law, and very few of the proposals even 
made it to the House or Senate Floor.”110 
After the Orlando shooting, four gun-control proposals made it to 
the Senate floor, but not without protest. Democratic Senator, 
Christopher S. Murphy led a 15-hour filibuster
111
 in order to get a 
commitment from majority leaders to hold votes on two gun control 
amendments favored by the Democrats.
112
 Eventually, a few days 
later, on June 20, 2016, the Senate voted on all four gun control 
proposals, two brought forth by Democrats and two by Republicans.
113
 
All four were rejected.
114
 Two of the amendments proposed focused 
on expanding background checks and are outside the scope of this 
Article.
115
 The other two amendments, which are discussed below, 
focus on prohibiting individuals on the TWL from purchasing 
firearms.
116
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The first proposal comes from Democratic Senator, Dianne 
Feinstein. Her amendment echoes her rejected measure from 
December of 2015.
117
 The second proposal comes from Republican 
Senator, John Cornyn, who also renewed his competing measure from 
December 2015.
118
 
B. Feinstein’s Proposal – S. Amdt. 4720 
The first amendment heard by the Senate came from Democratic 
Senator, Dianne Feinstein. The purpose of her proposed amendment 
was to grant the Attorney General authority to deny requests to 
transfer firearms to known or suspected terrorists.
119
 In pertinent part, 
her amendment states: 
The Attorney General may deny the transfer of a 
firearm if the Attorney General determines, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, that the transferee 
represents a threat to public safety based on a 
reasonable suspicion that the transferee is engaged, or 
has been engaged, in conduct constituting, in 
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism, or 
providing material support or resources therefor.
120
 
If a denial does take place, the transferee may pursue a remedy
121
 
for erroneous denial.
122
 The latter part of Feinstein’s amendment 
proposes that procedures should be established so that the Attorney 
General, or a designee of the Attorney General, shall be notified of an 
attempted purchase if an individual who is, or within the last five years 
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has been, under investigation for conduct related to a Federal Crime of 
Terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).
123
 
In order to clear procedural hurdles, Feinstein’s proposal needed a 
three-fifths majority vote to carry on.
124
 She fell short of this feat as 
her proposal only received 47 votes for and 53 against.
125
 Following its 
failure to proceed, a voice vote was held and the amendment was 
tabled.
126
 
Out of the 53 votes casted against the amendment, 52 came from 
Republican Senators.
127
 The main argument Republicans offered for 
rejecting the bill was that it paints with too broad of a brush and takes 
away persons’ constitutional rights for procedural due process; that is, 
it first bans them from purchasing firearms, then allows them to 
challenge the denial in court.
128
 In conjunction, Republicans also had a 
lingering concern over whether the process for appeal would be 
satisfactory to assist those erroneously affected.
129
 
Republicans’ rejection of Feinstein’s proposal suggests that a 
person’s procedural due process rights will be violated if a denial of 
transfer takes place before they are properly adjudicated.
130
 While the 
Republicans present a valid point, such a concern is not so clear-cut.
131
 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that 
“No person shall be . . . deprived life, liberty or property, without due 
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process of law.”132 When speaking about the application of the Due 
Process Clause the Supreme Court stated, “due process, unlike some 
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances. Due process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”133 
These remarks both limit and broaden the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment’s procedural protections based on the circumstances at 
hand. The application is not rigid, but rather, it is malleable. Thus, it is 
less convincing for Republicans to slap a due process label on 
Feinstein’s amendment and reject it without a proper evaluation of the 
particular situation. 
In Mathew v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court introduced a three-
factor balancing test to analyze procedural due process claims to assist 
in resolving whether procedures provided for are constitutionally 
sufficient.
134
 The three-factor balancing test requires the following 
analysis: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirements would entail.
135
 
In 2011, this balancing test was applied in Kuck v. Danaher, which 
sought to determine whether the Connecticut Department of Public 
Safety’s (“DPS”) procedure for renewing permits to carry firearms 
violated applicants’ procedural due process.136 In Kuck, the appellant 
centered his argument on the denial of his firearm permit, and the 
excessive delay in obtaining an appeal hearing.
137
 In applying 
Mathews’ balancing test, the court specifically focused on the second 
factor: the overall risk of erroneous deprivation of an applicant’s 
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property interest and the time-period required to correct such 
deprivation.
138
 In discussing the second factor the court stated, 
Broadly speaking, a delay amounts to a due process violation only 
where it renders the prescribed procedures meaningless in relation to 
the private interests at stake. The mere assertion that state remedies are 
lengthy will not render state remedies inadequate under the Due 
Process Clause unless they are inadequate to the point that they are 
meaningless or nonexistent.
139
 
Unable to account for a waiting period of a year and a half for an 
appeal hearing, the court found the DPS’ procedure to be in violation 
of the appellant’s due process.140 
Comparatively, the DPS’ procedure for permit renewals differs 
from Feinstein’s proposed procedure for denying a suspected 
terrorist’s purchase of firearms. However, the two can be likened by 
the complaints brought forward. In Kuck, the allegations of due 
process violations were two-fold: (1) the denial of a permit to carry a 
firearm, and (2) a prolonged subsequent remedial measure.
141
 
Similarly, under Feinstein’s proposal, an anticipated procedural due 
process claim, hinted to by Republicans, would be the same: (1) denial 
to purchase a firearm, and (2) a subsequent remedial measure. A 
procedural due process analysis as prescribed in Mathews is 
necessary.
142
 
The first step in Mathews’ balancing test looks at the effects that 
official actions will have on the private interest. Here, hypothetically 
speaking, it is the transferee’s property interest which is at stake. The 
property interest is the transferee’s right to bear arms: a fundamental 
right under the Second Amendment as applied to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
143
 There can be no doubt that such an interest 
exists and is affected by Feinstein’s proposal. 
The second step requires an analysis of the erroneous deprivation 
of a transferee’s property interest through the procedures provided for, 
and the probable value of, alternative procedures.
144
 As stated above, 
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the procedures in Feinstein’s proposal allows the DOJ to deny the 
purchase of a firearm if the Attorney General determines, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, that the transferee represents a threat to 
public safety based on a reasonable suspicion that the transferee is or 
has been engaged in conduct constituting the preparation or aiding of 
activity related to terrorism.
145
 The deprivation becomes erroneous 
when an intended transferee is incorrectly denied when attempting to 
purchase a firearm.
146
 
As discussed above, the TWL is not perfect, making it likely that 
such a deprivation will occur.
147
 However, just because an erroneous 
deprivation takes place prior to adjudication, does not necessarily 
mean it is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held that “the 
Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives 
a person of liberty or property.”148 However, in some circumstances, 
“the Court has held that a statutory provision for a post deprivation 
hearing . . . for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.”149 
Such was the case in Hightower v. City of Boston, where a former 
member of the Boston Police Department (“BPD”) brought forth a 
procedural due process claim alleging that a statutory scheme revoking 
her license to carry a Class A firearm prior to adjudication was 
inadequate.
150
 The Court upheld the statutory scheme as procedurally 
sufficient since the statute provided a post-deprivation process, which 
allowed aggrieved parties to file a petition to obtain judicial review in 
the district court within 90 days after notice of the revocation.
151
 
Likewise, Feinstein’s proposal provides a scheme for a post-
deprivation hearing for transferees erroneously affected.
152
 The 
available remedial procedures are laid out in § 103(g) of Public Law 
103-159, and the intended transferee can pursue a remedy for 
erroneous denial under 18 U.S.C. § 925A.
153
 The remedial procedure 
calls for the transferee to submit information to correct the erroneous 
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information preventing the purchase from being approved.
154
 Upon 
receiving that information, “the Attorney General shall immediately 
consider the information, investigate the matter further, and correct all 
erroneous federal records relating to the prospective transferee and 
give notice of the error to any federal department or agency or any 
state that was the source of such erroneous records.”155 Furthermore, a 
transferee may take action against the DOJ in order to direct them to 
correct the information and approve the transfer.
156
 
The final factor in Mathews’ balancing test requires an 
examination of the governmental interest in Feinstein’s proposal. Here, 
the government’s interest is public safety. More specifically, its 
interest concerns stopping suspected terrorists from legally purchasing 
firearms that are likely to be used to inflict harm on society. Such an 
interest is strong, compelling, and necessary. But, is it justified? 
There can be no doubt that the procedures set forth in Feinstein’s 
proposal may erroneously deprive intended transferees of their 
property interest in purchasing firearms. However, the deprivation is 
minimal in comparison to the governmental interest, especially 
considering the immediacy in which a post deprivation hearing would 
occur. When balancing the erroneous deprivation with the 
governmental interest at hand, it is likely that the remedial measures 
proposed comports with the circumstances in which a post deprivation 
hearing would be constitutionally sufficient under the Due Process 
Clause. 
Stepping away from the legal analysis and into prospective 
application, would there be a chance that some individuals would be 
erroneously affected? Absolutely; but, there would also be a chance 
that the precautionary measures proposed could help stop another 
terrorist attack, and if that is the case, requiring a balancing test seems 
unnecessary. 
C.  Cornyn’s Proposal – S. Amdt. 4749 
Republican Senator, John Cornyn introduced a competing measure 
after Feinstein’s amendment was tabled.157 The overall purpose of his 
                                                 
154
 See Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act § 103(g). 
155
 Id. Emphasis added. 
156
 See 18 U.S.C. § 925A. 
157
 S.amdt.4749, H.R. 2578, 114th Cong. (2016), 
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/114th-congress/senate-
 
400 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 376 
amendment aimed to secure the United States from terrorists by 
enhancing law enforcement detection.
158
 
Cornyn’s proposal calls on the Attorney General to establish a 
process in which “the Attorney General and Federal, State, and local 
law enforcement are immediately notified, as appropriate, of any 
request to transfer a firearm or explosive to a person who is, or within 
the previous 5 years was, investigated as a known or suspected 
terrorist.”159 Unlike Feinstein’s proposal, the intended transferee 
would not be denied a firearm upfront, but instead allows the Attorney 
General to delay the transfer of the firearm for a period not exceeding 
three business days.
160
 Within that time, the Attorney General may file 
an emergency petition to prevent the transfer of the firearm from being 
completed.
161
 With regard to the hearing, Cornyn’s proposal states that 
the petition and subsequent hearing will receive the highest possible 
priority on the docket of the court rendering the decision.
162
 The 
proposal goes on to state that the transferee will receive actual notice 
of the hearing, and will have the opportunity to participate with 
counsel, thus satisfying due process requirements.
163
 
The final portion of Cornyn’s amendment speaks to the burden of 
proof the government would have to satisfy in order to prevent a 
transfer from being completed. The amendment states that “the 
emergency petition shall be granted if the court finds that there is 
probable cause to believe that the transferee has committed, conspired 
to commit, attempted to commit, or will commit an act of 
terrorism.”164 
Like Feinstein’s amendment, Cornyn’s proposal failed to meet the 
requisite majority vote needed to clear procedural hurdles. Cornyn 
received 53 votes in favor of his proposal, and 47 against.
165
 Forty-two 
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of the votes rejecting Cornyn’s proposal came from Democrats.166 
Admittedly, it is surprising that Cornyn’s proposal failed to meet 60 
votes, especially considering his amendment secured the endorsement 
of the National Rifle Association.
167
 Nevertheless, the majority of 
Democratic senators felt that the amendment placed too high of a 
burden on the Attorney General to prevent a firearm transfer within 
such a short period of time.
168
 
As stated above, Cornyn’s amendment, if it had been enacted, 
would have allowed a court to grant the emergency petition denying an 
intended transferee’s purchase of a firearm if it found probable cause 
to believe the transferee had engaged in, or would engage in an act of 
terrorism.
169
 Probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances 
within the [Attorney General’s] knowledge and of which [there] is 
reasonably trustworthy information sufficient in themselves to warrant 
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is 
being committed.”170 In evaluating whether the Attorney General has 
met this burden a court looks at the totality of the circumstances.
171
 A 
totality of the circumstances analysis calls for an assessment which 
balances the “relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability” 
stemming from the DOJ.
172
 
The existence of probable cause is perfectly demonstrated in 
Draper v. United States.
173
 In Draper, an informant had provided 
information to a federal narcotics agent, Marsh, about an individual 
suspected of peddling narcotics from Chicago to Denver by train.
174
 
The information provided to Marsh was very specific.
175
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informant was able to provide Marsh with the suspect’s expected 
arrival day into Denver, the clothing he would be wearing, the bag he 
would be carrying, and the quickness in which he would be moving 
through the train station.
176
 Acting on the informant’s tip, Marsh went 
to the train station on both days provided to him.
177
 On the second day, 
Marsh saw an individual matching the description provided to him by 
the informant.
178
 The individual had the same physical attributes and 
same clothing, and was moving hurriedly through the train station after 
exiting a track in which the incoming train was from Chicago.
179
 
Marsh approached the suspect, uncovered several envelopes 
containing heroin, and arrested him on the spot.
180
 The arrestee 
claimed that Marsh lacked probable cause because the information he 
had was insufficient to prove that he had violated or was violating the 
narcotic laws.
181
 In response, the Court stated, “In dealing with 
probable cause, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, 
not legal technicians act.”182 Thus, looking at the facts and 
circumstances as a whole, including the relative weight of all the 
various indicia of reliability, the Court determined that probable cause 
existed.
183
 
Draper illustrates the facts and circumstances expected to be 
present in order for a court to find the existence of probable cause.
184
 
One can imagine the difficulty the DOJ would have in putting together 
such a case on an individual in just three business days. Regardless of 
the flexibility of the probable cause application, such a task will be too 
tall to overcome. Due to this obvious roadblock, Democrats denied 
Cornyn’s proposal.185 
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Given only three business days, it is understandable how such a 
time restraint can decrease the likeliness of a successful case being 
built. It is not as though the Attorney General is actively building a 
case on every individual on the TWL. It is only when the transfer of a 
firearm is attempted would the DOJ receive notice and initiate its 
investigation to prevent the transfer. Needless to say, Democrats’ issue 
with Cornyn’s proposed burden of proof is reasonable; yet, offering a 
probable cause standard was logical. 
The current standard for placing individuals on the TWL is 
reasonable suspicion.
186
 First pronounced in Terry v. Ohio,
187
 the 
standard requires that an officer have articulable and specific facts 
which give rise to reasonable suspicion that a crime is being 
committed in order to justify a brief detention of an individual.
188
 The 
Supreme Court recognized reasonable suspicion to be a less 
demanding standard than probable cause.
189
 The FBI has adopted this 
standard for purposes of including individuals on the TWL.
190
 This 
shines a light on why Cornyn may have chosen probable cause to be 
the standard in his proposal. It does not make sense to use the same 
standard for placing an individual on the TWL and for preventing one 
of these individuals from purchasing a firearm. In theory, everyone on 
the TWL would be prevented from purchasing a firearm just because 
they meet the status quo. There can be no doubt that a burden higher 
than reasonable suspicion is required to prevent the transfer of a 
firearm. Perhaps the establishment of an intermediate standard 
applicable to individuals on the TWL is warranted. 
Use of an intermediate standard between probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion is not a new concept. In Griffin v. Wisconsin,
191
 
the Supreme Court recognized the State of Wisconsin’s use of a 
“reasonable grounds” standard within its probationary system—as a 
replacement for probable cause—to justify a search of a probationer’s 
home.
192
 In Griffin, the State’s operation of its probationary system 
subjects probationers to conditions set by the court and rules and 
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regulations established by the State Department of Health and Social 
Services.
193
 One regulation permits probation officers to search a 
probationer’s home without a warrant so long as his supervisor 
approves and as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe 
there is presence of contraband.
194
 In upholding Wisconsin’s 
“reasonable grounds” standard, the Court stated that they find it 
unnecessary to embrace a new principle of law, but that it has 
permitted exceptions when “special needs, beyond the normal need for 
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”195 The Court defines the “special needs” in Griffin to 
be the supervision of probationers to ensure the protection of the 
public from harm.
196
 
The “special needs” discussed in Griffin is analogous to the 
circumstances surrounding known or suspected terrorists on the 
TWL.
197
 The FBI supervises individuals they have deemed a potential 
threat in order to protect the public from harm. To ensure this 
protection, it is imperative to regulate the transfer of firearms to 
anyone on the TWL. Cornyn’s proposal attempts to balance these 
needs, while also protecting the Second Amendment rights of anyone 
erroneously placed on the TWL. Conceivably, introducing a unique 
standard could help achieve this goal. 
Similar to Griffin, the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
198
 
allowed a showing of less than probable cause to justify searching 
students on school grounds who were likely to have engaged in 
conduct detrimental to the school’s policies and procedures.199 The 
Court stated that the legality of such a search should “depend simply 
on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”200 
Furthering the standard announced, the Court held “where a careful 
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the 
public interest is best served by a . . . standard of reasonableness that 
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stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a 
standard.” 201 
Given the decisions in both Griffin and T.L.O., it is apparent that 
the Supreme Court has recognized and accepted an intermediate 
standard between probable cause and reasonable suspicion when 
warranted. This intermediate ground is one of reasonableness. Without 
clearly delineating a rule, the Supreme Court has carved out this 
exception when it has been for the greater good of the public’s interest. 
This standard speaks to permitting a governmental or regulatory action 
when a court or an administration find it reasonable, under all of the 
circumstances, that some negative event, or act, has or is likely to 
occur. 
In the case of an emergency petition being sought after in order to 
prevent the transfer of a firearm to an individual on the TWL, it should 
fall upon the deciding court whether it is reasonable to conclude that 
the intended transferee is likely to commit an act of terror. Such a 
standard would provide the DOJ the ability to build an effective case 
in order to prevent the transfer. In aiming to protect the public from 
another tragic attack by individuals investigated for terrorism, a 
standard focusing on reasonableness, rather than probable cause, 
seems justifiable. 
III. PROPOSING COMMON SENSE GUN CONTROL REGULATION 
Democrats seem to find reason to continuously reject gun control 
measures sponsored by Republicans, and vice versa. Repeatedly, the 
two parties fail to act as a bipartisanship and as a result the country 
suffers. To outsiders looking in, the two parties are more focused on 
disapproving one another’s agenda, rather than acting cohesively to 
push for sensible gun control regulation. The two proposed 
amendments above exemplify this behavior. Republicans raised due 
process concerns they found in Feinstein’s proposal, while Democrats 
took issue with the burden of proof set in Cornyn’s proposal.202 Based 
on the concerns and considerations above, and in conjunction with the 
rejected measures, the following gun control regulation is proposed: 
1. The Attorney General and the Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement shall be promptly notified of any request to 
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transfer a firearm or explosive to a person who is, or within the 
previous five (5) years was, investigated as a known or 
suspected terrorist. 
2. Upon receiving notification, the Attorney General may delay 
the transfer of the firearm or explosive for a period not to 
exceed thirty (30) days. If there is no cause for delay, the 
transfer may proceed at the Federal Firearm Licensee’s 
discretion. 
3. At any point within or up to the thirty (30) days provided for 
delay, the Attorney General may file a petition to prevent the 
transfer of the firearm within a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The petition and the subsequent hearing shall receive the 
highest possible priority on the docket; which shall not exceed 
sixty (60) days from the initial attempted firearm purchase and 
transfer. 
4. The intended transferee will receive actual notice of the 
hearing and will be provided an opportunity to participate with 
legal counsel. 
5. The court shall grant the petition if it determines that there is 
reasonable cause to believe, given the totality of the 
circumstances, that the intended transferee represents a threat 
to public safety, or has committed, has attempted and/or 
conspired to commit, or will commit an act of terrorism. 
6. Denial by the court pursuant to this provision will equate to a 
determination that a transfer of a firearm or explosive would 
violate 18 U.S.C., 922 § (g) or (n). 
Section one of the proposal sets the parameters of who the 
amendment will affect. The goal is to prevent known or suspected 
terrorists from purchasing firearms. Both of the rejected measures 
above call for the Attorney General to be notified if someone currently 
on the TWL, or recently removed within the previous five years, 
attempts to purchase a firearm. This is a sound policy. The Orlando 
shooting illustrates the reasoning for such latitude. Mateen was twice 
removed from the TWL.
203
 One year following his second removal, 
Mateen legally purchased multiple firearms that he used during his 
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attack.
204
 If this policy was in place in June of 2016, not only would 
the Attorney General have received notification, but it is also likely 
that the NICS would have had proper grounds to delay, or even deny, 
the transaction. For that reason, it is necessary the regulation 
encompasses individuals on or recently removed from the TWL. 
Sections two through six outline the procedures for delaying the 
transfer, and subsequent steps to prevent the transfer completely. 
Section two of the proposal focuses on implementing a thirty-day 
delay for anyone on or recently removed from the TWL. Both of the 
rejected proposals pursued different effects: one called for a denial and 
the other a delay.
205
 Seemingly, an initial delay, rather than denial, is 
the better of the two options. NICS’ current procedure and Cornyn’s 
rejected measure, called for a three-business day delay.
206
 This is 
inadequate. The DOJ should be given thirty days to build its case. The 
Supreme Court has found post deprivation hearings to be 
constitutionally sufficient under certain circumstances.
207
 A thirty-day 
delay is not likely to amount to a violation of a transferee’s due 
process. Addressing this issue in Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen,
 
the 
Supreme Court stated: 
[E]ven though there is a point at which an unjustified 
delay in completing a post-deprivation proceeding 
would become a constitutional violation, the 
significance of such a delay cannot be evaluated in a 
vacuum. In determining how long a delay is justified in 
affording a post-suspension hearing and decision, it is 
appropriate to examine the importance of the private 
interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by 
delay; the justification offered by the Government for 
delay and its relation to the underlying governmental 
interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision 
may have been mistaken.
208
 
Here, the private interest is the individual’s right to possess a 
firearm. The government’s interest is public safety. So long as an 
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intended transferee’s livelihood is not substantially affected by the 
brief deprivation prior to the hearing, a thirty-day delay should suffice. 
And while there can be no doubt that individuals will be erroneously 
deprived during this delay, their interest is arguably outweighed by the 
government’s interest in protecting the public. On the other hand, 
should the DOJ find no reason to delay the transfer of a firearm, the 
transaction may proceed at the discretion of the FFL. 
Section three discusses the procedure for the Attorney General 
should (s)he petition a firearm transfer. At any point during, or before 
the conclusion of, the thirty-day delay the Attorney General may file a 
petition within a court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the transfer. 
The petition and the subsequent hearing shall receive the highest 
possible priority on the docket so that the hearing will be held no more 
than 60 days from an intended transferee’s initial attempt to purchase a 
firearm. Section four discusses the procedural due process afforded to 
an intended transferee. Aligned with the standards of due process, a 
transferee will receive actual notice of the hearing and will be 
provided an opportunity to participate with legal counsel. 
Section five of the proposal sets forth the standard for denying a 
firearm transfer. Here, the court shall grant the petition, denying the 
transfer, if it determines that there is reasonable cause to believe, under 
all of the circumstances, that the intended transferee is a threat to 
public safety, or has or will commit an act of terrorism. Feinstein’s 
proposal offered a reasonable suspicion standard, and Cornyn’s 
probable cause. As Congress failed to agree on these competing 
standards, this proposal offers a reasonable cause standard which finds 
resolution somewhere in the middle. As discussed supra, the Supreme 
Court found a “reasonable grounds” standard to be acceptable for a 
probationary scheme where “special needs” made probable cause 
impractical.
209
 Furthermore, the Court held a “reasonableness” 
standard to be acceptable where the balancing of governmental and 
private interests would be better served.
210
 Introducing a unique 
standard applicable to individuals on the TWL comports with the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Griffin and T.L.O., and is justified to 
safeguard the public from harm. 
The final section of the amendment, section six, equates the denial 
of a firearm transfer to violations under 18 U.S.C., § 922 (g) or (n). As 
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indicated supra, prior to FFLs transferring a firearm to a transferee, the 
NICS will be contacted to see whether the transfer will violate 18 
U.S.C., § 922 (g) or (n), which makes it unlawful to transfer a firearm 
to an individual for a wide range of reasons.
211
 Such reasons include 
transferring a firearm to persons who are fugitives; persons who have 
been adjudicated as a mental defective; persons who are aliens and 
illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or persons convicted for 
using or possessing a controlled substance within a certain time period 
to possess or receive any firearm.
212
 However, nowhere among the 
prohibitive conditions does it state that it is unlawful to transfer a 
firearm to a known or suspected terrorist. So, under this proposal, a 
court finding it reasonable to believe that an individual is likely to 
engage in act of terrorism will be equivalent to those violations 
enumerated under U.S.C., § 922 (g) or (n). 
This proposal, while not perfect, demonstrates that there is room 
for compromise. Congress can and should enact legislation which calls 
for a stricter procedure for when individuals on, or recently removed 
from, the TWL attempt to purchase firearms. Nevertheless, Congress 
fails to work as a bipartisanship. Perhaps the lack of successful 
regulations stem from Congress being influenced by special interest 
groups and gun lobbyists. Whatever the reason may be, Congress’s 
failure to act is unsupportable. As Scalia stated in Heller, an 
individual’s right to possess firearms secured under the Second 
Amendment is not limitless.
213
 Specifically, Scalia declared: “nothing 
in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” 214 
Such language provides the basis for Congress to construct conditions 
and qualifications pertaining to the transfer of firearms to individuals 
on, or recently removed from, the TWL. Accordingly, it is time for 
Congress to go to work. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress’ failure to work in unison to pass common sense gun 
regulation is unacceptable. Rather than working constructively to 
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produce a supportable proposal, Democrats and Republicans appear 
more interested in criticizing one another. Such behavior is 
exemplified in Congress’ inability to approve one of the four 
amendments proposed between December 2015 and June 2016. As a 
result of Congress’ failure in passing legislation to prevent known or 
suspected terrorists from legally purchasing firearms, the doors remain 
open for such individuals to commit more attacks. 
Working in a bipartisan manner, Congress needs to construct, 
support, and approve gun regulations that disallow known or suspected 
terrorists on, or recently removed from, the TWL from legally 
purchasing firearms in the United States. Sitting in the position to do 
so, and equipped with the necessary legislative tools, the time for 
Congress to act is now. The country has waited long enough. 
 
